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Abstract: This paper attempts to reconcile critics and defenders of inclusive fitness by 
constructing a synthesis that does justice to the insights of both. I argue that criticisms 
of the regression-based version of Hamilton’s rule, although they undermine its use 
for predictive purposes, do not undermine its use as an organizing framework for 
social evolution research. I argue that the assumptions underlying the concept of 
inclusive fitness, conceived as a causal property of an individual organism, are 
unlikely to be exactly true in real populations, but they are approximately true given a 
specific type of weak selection that Hamilton took, on independent grounds, to be 
responsible for the cumulative assembly of complex adaptation. Finally, I reflect on 
the uses and limitations of “design thinking” in social evolution research. 
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The debate about the foundations of inclusive fitness theory that has followed in the wake of 
Nowak, Tarnita and Wilson’s (1) critique has been remarkably polarizing. After several 
rounds of rebuttals and replies, there is still little evidence of any serious reconciliation 
between the theory’s critics (2-10) and its defenders (11-24). It doesn’t have to be this way. I 
believe that, on the main points of disagreement, it is possible to find a way forward that does 
justice to the insights of both camps. My aim in this paper is to find that way forward. 
 
 
1. Kin selection, Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness 
 
The concepts of kin selection, Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness are often run together. 
They are, to be sure, closely related, but they should be distinguished (21, 25). Here is how I 
will use these concepts in this paper. 
 
1.1 Kin selection 
Kin selection is a process that occurs in nature: a variety of natural selection in which the 
direction of evolutionary change is affected by correlated interaction between genetic 
relatives. It is something that happens out there in the world, independently of the methods 
social evolution theorists may invent to analyse it, and independently of the controversies 
theorists may have about these methods (17, 23, 26). 
 
I will not discuss the empirical evidence for kin selection in this paper (12, 13, 20). 
Ultimately, I do not think the current controversies surrounding inclusive fitness and related 
ideas are primarily empirical debates about the existence, or otherwise, of kin selection. Both 
sides accept that kin selection occurs (27, 28). There are empirical disagreements about the 
importance of kin selection in explaining particular biological phenomena, such as the 
evolution of eusociality (8, 14, 22), but I do not see these debates about particular biological 
phenomena as the core of the controversy. At its core, this is a controversy not about the 
existence of kin selection, but about the explanatory value of the conceptual and theoretical 
framework Hamilton (29-32) constructed to make sense of it. This framework has two key 
ingredients: Hamilton’s rule and inclusive fitness. 
 
1.2 Hamilton’s rule 
Hamilton’s rule is a mathematical condition for positive change in the frequency of a trait in 
a population undergoing natural selection, expressed in terms of three population statistics 
defined with reference to that trait: relatedness (r), benefit (b) and cost (c). The rule states 
that a trait will undergo positive change due to natural selection if and only if rb – c > 0 (29). 
 
In its most general, regression-based form (17, 33), the rule is a highly abstract result that 
applies not only to cases of kin selection in the above sense but to all cases of natural 
selection, including those cases in which r = 0 and those cases in which r > 0 due to causes, 
such as “greenbeard” mechanisms (34, 35), that do not rely on correlated interaction between 
biological kin in the ordinary sense of the word. Because of its highly abstract nature, there is 
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room for legitimate debate as to what, if anything, Hamilton’s rule explains about social 
evolution, and I will consider this question in Section 2. 
 
1.3 Inclusive fitness 
Inclusive fitness, as Hamilton (30) conceived it, is a property of an individual organism, 
defined as a weighted sum of the effects on reproductive success it causes by means of its 
behaviour. The weights are coefficients of relatedness. The term has sometimes taken on 
other meanings, and other authors prefer to use the term “inclusive fitness” to refer to a 
property of a trait, strategy, or lineage (36-38). But for Hamilton, it was a property of an 
individual organism (see Section 3).  
 
It is, at first sight, a strange quantity (see Section 3). Yet Hamilton regarded it as the best way 
of thinking about the fitness of an organism in the context of social evolution, and his 
successors in what we might call the Hamiltonian tradition in social evolution theory, such as 
Grafen, Gardner and West, tend to agree (39-41). They claim inclusive fitness is uniquely 
able to capture the design objective of social adaptation—the goal towards which all social 
adaptation is directed. I consider this claim in Sections 3 and 4. 
  
 
2. The status of Hamilton’s rule 
 
2.1 What the critics get right 
There are various formulations of Hamilton’s rule, and the different versions attach different 
meanings to the cost, benefit and relatedness coefficients (23, 42, 43). The current 
controversy has predominantly centred on the generalized, regression-based version first 
formulated by Queller (33), in which relatedness is a regression coefficient capturing the 
statistical association between the genotypes of social partners, and cost and benefit are 
partial regression coefficients in a regression model of reproductive success. I have elsewhere 
called this version HRG (G for both general and genic) (42). 
 
Critics of HRG point out, correctly, that the rule in this generalized, regression-based form is 
general because it is tautology-like (2, 7). The rule says, roughly speaking, that the 
evolutionary change under one, coarse-grained description is positive if and only if the 
evolutionary change under another, finer-grained description is also positive. The coarse-
grained description is simply the overall change in the frequency of a gene, or in the mean 
value of a polygenic character. The finer-grained description uses a regression model to 
partition the overall change into an rb component that captures indirect fitness effects and a – 
c component that captures direct fitness effects. The rule simply notes an equivalence 
between two different ways of describing change, without making any detailed assumptions 
about the causes of change.  
 
By way of analogy, it is akin to saying that a candidate wins a US presidential election if and 
only if that candidate wins more than 269 votes in the electoral college: the result, described 
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in general terms, is equivalent to the result described at a finer grain of analysis (4). This is 
why (although a few assumptions are required) Hamilton’s rule can be said to be “as general 
as the genetical theory of natural selection itself” (11). 
 
As a consequence, HRG is not much use for prediction, as Allen et al (7) correctly note. If 
one has the information necessary to calculate the relatedness, cost and benefit coefficients in 
HRG exactly (i.e. complete information about the genotypic values, fitness values and social 
interactions in the target population), then one also has the information necessary to calculate 
the exact response to selection directly. Prediction does not come into it. The change under 
one, finer-grained description cannot be said to predict the change under another, coarser-
grained description, any more than a state-by-state breakdown of an election result can be 
said to predict the overall result.  
 
Alternative versions of Hamilton’s rule invoke stronger assumptions, and these versions, not 
HRG, should be used for predictive purposes. In particular, an approximate, “marginal” 
version that replaces the partial regression coefficients with partial derivatives of a fitness 
function can be used to derive predictions about evolutionarily stable strategies (44-46).  
 
Allen et al (7) are also justified in their assertion that HRG does not, by itself, provide causal 
explanations of evolutionary change. Regression coefficients capture statistical associations, 
and statistical association is not causation (47-50). To explain change causally, it is not 
enough to know the values of the population statistics r, b and c. These population statistics 
mathematically imply changes in gene frequency (just as the state-by-state breakdown 
mathematically implies the national result), but they do not cause those changes (any more 
than the state-by-state breakdown causes the national result). For a causal explanation, one 
also needs to know the evolutionary dynamics causally responsible for the values of r, b and 
c, including, where applicable, the population structure and the payoff structure of social 
interaction.  
 
For example, positive relatedness (r > 0) in a population may be explained by underlying 
assortative processes as diverse as kin discrimination, limited dispersal, shared habitat 
preference, recognition of greenbeard-like phenotypic markers, or even, in microbes, gene 
mobility, and the way in which positive relatedness is generated can make a difference to the 
evolutionary stability of a social trait (32, 35, 41, 51-54). In any particular scenario in which 
relatedness is found to be positive, a satisfactory causal explanation of change should thus 
cite the causes of positive relatedness; if the aim is to elucidate the causal processes driving 
change, it is not enough to state merely that relatedness is positive without saying why. The 
same can be said of cost and benefit.  
 
2.2 What the defenders get right 
In spite of all this, I maintain that HRG is a useful and important result. This is because it 
provides an organizing framework that helps us structure our thinking about the causes of 
social evolution (56). An organizing framework is not in competition with detailed models of 
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particular ecological scenarios. It is intended to provide us with a helpful way of interpreting, 
classifying and comparing such models. 
 
The idea is that, by partitioning change into two biologically meaningful components (rb and 
–c), HRG provides an organizing framework that is distinctively valuable for social evolution 
research. What it does, in essence, is provide a scheme for categorizing causal explanations 
of evolutionary change. Any causal explanation of change in a particular trait, whether it 
takes the form of a detailed mathematical model or an informal verbal account, will have 
implied or explicit commitments regarding the costs and benefits of the trait and the 
relatedness between social partners. HRG provides a way of categorizing explanations by 
these commitments. For it shows that all causal explanations of positive change, in any 
character and in any population, must fall into one of four broad categories, depending on the 
signs of rb and c. These categories can be visualized in terms of a space of explanations 
(Figure 1).  
 
FIGURE 1 CAPTION: Partitioning the space of explanations. HRG allows us to 
distinguish four broad classes of explanation of positive evolutionary change in a social 
trait, defined by their commitments regarding the values of rb and c. All explanations of 
positive change lie somewhere in this space. The corresponding space for negative 
change is an inversion of this space (with O as the centre of inversion) (Figure © the 
author, reprinted from 56). 
 
 
First, there are indirect fitness explanations, for which rb > 0 and c ≥ 0. These explanations 
cite a cause of relatedness to explain why the direct fitness costs associated with a trait (i.e. 
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costs to the actor) are offset by indirect fitness benefits (i.e. benefits to related recipients). 
Second, there are direct fitness explanations, for which c < 0 and rb ≤ 0. These explanations 
show how, over the lifetime of the actor, the trait yields direct fitness benefits, so that no 
indirect benefits are required. Third, there are hybrid explanations that appeal to both direct 
and indirect fitness effects as drivers of positive change, and for which rb > 0 and c < 0. 
Fourth, there are partially or wholly non-selective explanations that appeal to a process other 
than fitness differences between organisms. Such processes may include drift, migration, 
mutation, environmental change, or forms of within-organism selection such as gametic 
selection or meiotic drive (formally, these are processes captured in the “transmission bias” 
term in the Price equation and in Frank’s “exact-total” version of Hamilton’s rule; 45, 57, 
58). HRG tells us that, if rb ≤ c, any adequate explanation of positive change must appeal to 
at least one such process. 
 
The insight embodied by HRG is that every adequate causal explanation of positive change 
can be placed somewhere in this space. It also shows how the space of possible explanations 
is constrained by adding information about cost, benefit and relatedness. For example, if a 
trait is known to be costly in the technical sense that it detracts from the lifetime reproductive 
success of the actor (implying positive c), HRG tells us that an adequate causal explanation 
of positive change in that trait must appeal either to indirect fitness effects or else to non-
selective processes, because direct fitness effects alone are not sufficient. These are insights 
that are obvious once one understands HRG, but far from obvious otherwise.  
 
We can use this organizing framework as the basis for a more detailed taxonomy of 
explanations of change (48). For example, indirect fitness explanations can be classified at a 
finer grain by the causes of relatedness they cite (e.g. kin discrimination or limited dispersal). 
Direct fitness explanations can be classified at a finer grain by the nature of the causal 
pathway that positively links the behaviour to the lifetime reproductive success of the actor, 
which may involve immediate returns, or may be mediated by reciprocity, punishment or 
reward. In this way, HRG structures the way social evolution theorists think about the causes 
of social evolution, shaping research programs and allowing for overarching syntheses of 
diverse results (19, 58-61). 
 
Importantly, this organizing role of HRG is not undermined by the examples Allen et al. 
construct to challenge its predictive and causal-explanatory utility (7). For instance, Allen et 
al. describe a scenario in which a “hanger-on” trait causes its bearers to seek out and interact 
with individuals of high fitness. This leads to an association between an organism’s fitness 
and the behaviour of its social partner, implying positive b, yet the hanger-on trait makes no 
causal contribution to fitness. Such examples show that one should be wary of interpreting b 
and c as measures of direct causal influence. However, they are not (and are not intended to 
be) counterexamples to HRG, and they do not show that HRG misclassifies explanations of 
change. The scenario Allen et al. describe is one in which rb = c, so the categorization 
scheme in Figure 1 implies, correctly, that any positive change in the hanger-on trait must be 
explained by a non-selective process.  
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The best way to challenge the use of HRG as an organizing framework is not to construct 
counterexamples (since all sides agree that it is a correct mathematical result), but to argue 
that a different partition of change provides a more useful or biologically insightful 
categorization scheme (56). Here, the defender of HRG should concede that it is certainly not 
the only possible organizing framework for social evolution research. The Price equation 
(from which HRG is derived) can be regarded as providing an organizing framework at an 
even coarser grain of analysis: it simply partitions change into a component due to natural 
selection and a component due to transmission bias, without partitioning the change due to 
natural selection into any further components (62-64). HRG, by partitioning the change due 
to selection at a finer grain of analysis than the Price equation, is particularly useful for 
organizing explanations of social evolution. One notable rival to HRG in this respect is the 
framework of multi-level selection theory (32, 57, 65, 66). This too can be seen as a 
framework that organizes our thinking about the causes of social evolution by partitioning the 
space of explanations. This is not the place for a detailed comparison of the two frameworks 
(see 43, 56), but one important limitation of the multi-level framework, at least in the version 
developed by Price, is worth emphasizing: it only applies in populations that have a certain 
kind of structure, whereby the population is subdivided into objective, discrete, social groups. 
A distinctive advantage of HRG is that it still holds regardless of the population structure. 
 
2.3 The way forward 
HRG has been criticized for being an “empty statement” or tautology, for failing to yield 
predictions of change, and for failing to yield causal explanations of change. There is some 
justification for all of these charges, but they do not undermine the use of HRG as an 
organizing framework: a framework for interpreting, comparing and classifying more 
detailed evolutionary models.  
 
It is a virtue of an organizing framework that it operates at a high level of abstraction, 
invoking few assumptions: this makes it compatible with a wide range of underlying models, 
while also allowing us to make biologically meaningful comparisons between those models. 
For example, it allows us to see that, for all their underlying differences, models of the 
evolution of costly social behaviour by natural selection must invoke a cause of relatedness, 
such as kin discrimination, limited dispersal, shared habitat preference, greenbeard effects or 
gene mobility. 
 
There is room for a productive debate regarding the value of HRG in comparison to other 
possible organizing frameworks, such as multi-level selection theory. Progress on this issue 
can be made by identifying the properties we value in an organizing framework (such as its 
compatibility with different possible population structures), and by evaluating the extent to 
which different frameworks possess these properties. 
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3. The status of inclusive fitness 
 
Hamilton’s rule is a statistical, population-level result. Inclusive fitness, by contrast, is an 
explicitly causal property of an individual organism. Here is how Hamilton defined inclusive 
fitness: 
 
Inclusive fitness may be imagined as the personal fitness which an individual actually expresses in its 
production of adult offspring as it becomes after it has been stripped and augmented in a certain way. It 
is stripped of all components which can be considered as due to the individual’s social environment, 
leaving the fitness he would express if not exposed to any of the harms or benefits of that environment. 
This quantity is then augmented by certain fractions of the quantities of harm and benefit which the 
individual himself causes to the fitness of his neighbours. The fractions in question are simply the 
coefficients of relationship. (30, p. 8) 
 
As noted above, there are other theorists who think about inclusive fitness differently: 
Queller, for example, has argued that we should think of inclusive fitness as a property of a 
trait or strategy rather than an individual (36), and Akçay and van Cleve argue that we should 
think of it as a property of a lineage (37). But we can see clearly that, for Hamilton himself, 
inclusive fitness was, first and foremost, a property of an individual.  We can, of course, talk 
of the mean inclusive fitness of a population, or of the bearers of a particular trait. But these 
averages are derivative notions: the fundamental notion is a property of an individual. It also 
could not be clearer that inclusive fitness, as Hamilton conceived it, is inherently causal: it is 
a weighted sum of the effects on reproductive success for which the focal organism is 
causally responsible (Figure 2). 
  
	  	   10 
 
FIGURE 2 CAPTION: Inclusive fitness. An individual organism’s inclusive fitness is a 
weighted sum of the effects of its behaviour on reproductive success. In this illustration, 
organism 1’s behaviour affects the reproductive success of itself and of organisms 2, 3, 
and 4 (as shown by the arrows; the shaded regions represent components of 
reproductive success caused by the behaviour of organism 1). Organism 1’s inclusive 
fitness consists of a baseline non-social component, plus the effect on its own 
reproductive success caused by its own behaviour, plus its effects on organisms 2, 3, and 
4, weighted in each case by the relevant coefficient of relatedness. In a population 
without class-structure, the coefficient of relatedness will be the same for every social 
partner and will correspond to the r coefficient in HRG (for discussion of cases in which 
class-structure is present, see 39, 45, 46) (Figure © the author, reprinted from 56). 
 
 
3.1 What the critics get right 
Critics of inclusive fitness argue that it is committed, at a conceptual level, to the validity of 
an additive causal model of fitness (1, 7). They are right about this. The procedure Hamilton 
describes in the above paragraph involves crediting components of reproductive output to the 
actors whose social behaviour was causally responsible for them, rather than crediting them 
to the organisms that actually produced the offspring. For example, the larvae produced by a 
queen in a social insect colony should be credited not to the queen but to the workers who 
rear them. If this procedure is to avoid problems of double-counting, it must be that the 
reproductive success of an organism can be written as a sum of components, each of which is 
attributable to the social behaviour of a single social actor. Let us call this assumption fitness 
additivity. Moreover, it must be that the value of each component depends only on the 
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genotype of the actor, and not on the genotype of the recipient, an assumption known as 
actor’s control (39). 
 
The assumptions of fitness additivity and actor’s control are essential for inclusive fitness, 
conceived as a property of an individual organism, to make sense. Grafen, for example, 
writes that “the question of how to define inclusive fitness in the absence of additivity has not 
been settled, and so fundamental theory on the non-additive case can hardly yet begin” (39, p. 
544). Thus the reliance of inclusive fitness, as Hamilton conceived it, on fitness additivity 
and actor’s control is something even its most committed defenders should acknowledge. 
Note here that, by contrast, the population-level result HRG has been applied to cases of non-
additive payoffs. Regardless of the causal structure of social interaction, one can always use a 
regression model to partition change at the population level into an rb component and a -c 
component (17, 33, 42, 43, 60). This, however, is not the same as defining inclusive fitness 
qua property of an individual organism in the non-additive case. Grafen rightly identifies this 
as a genuine problem. 
 
The critics proceed to argue that there are many biologically plausible ways in which 
violations of these assumptions can arise. They are right about this too, although the point is 
not new: authors in the social evolution literature have made it repeatedly (67-70). Consider, 
for example, a genotype that disposes its bearer to produce an alarm call. In so doing, it 
reveals the organism’s location to nearby predators, adversely affecting its ability to benefit 
from the alarm calls of others. In this scenario, the benefit of receiving an alarm call for a 
recipient does not just depend on the genotype of the actor. It also depends on a fact about the 
recipient (i.e. whether or not the recipient has also produced an alarm call) that is sensitive to 
its genotype. Actor’s control is violated. 
 
Defenders of inclusive fitness should accept this too. Fitness additivity and actor’s control are 
strong assumptions, and they are unlikely to be exactly true in real populations. In fact, 
Grafen does acknowledge this, writing, for example, that “the assumption of additivity is 
made throughout this paper, but is not in general a realistic assumption. In many applications, 
non-additivity is an important part of the problem” (39, p. 543). The critics may reply, with 
some justification, that this point is absent from some of the more forthright defences of 
inclusive fitness (11).  
 
3.2 What the defenders get right  
Critics of inclusive fitness are likely to feel that the discussion should end here: since 
inclusive fitness makes strong assumptions that are often violated in real populations, we 
should stop using it as a fitness concept. For example, Allen and Nowak conclude from the 
unrealistic nature of the additivity assumption that “there is no inclusive fitness at the level of 
the individual” (9). Yet, despite all of the above, I think a good case can be made for the 
theoretical value of inclusive fitness, conceived as a property of an individual.   
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3.2.1 Weak selection and Fisher’s microscope 
Defenders of inclusive fitness have often noted that its assumptions can be justified as 
approximations if we assume a specific form of weak selection, usually known as δ-weak 
selection (39, 71-73). To assume δ-weak selection is to assume that the character of interest is 
a quantitative character, and that the alternatives competing in the population are a wild type 
and a mutant that differs only very slightly from the wild type. For example, a δ-weak 
selection model of an alarm call scenario might pit a wild type strategy in which an organism 
makes an alarm call with probability q against a mutant strategy in which an organism makes 
an alarm call with probability q + δ, where δ is a very small increment such that δ2 ≈ 0 (73). 
 
With this assumption in place, we can reinterpret inclusive fitness in terms of marginal (or 
differential) causal effects, attributable to small deviations from the wild type, rather than 
total causal effects. In other words, instead of defining an actor’s inclusive fitness as a 
baseline component plus a weighted sum of the total effects of its behaviour on reproductive 
success, we instead define an actor’s inclusive fitness as a baseline component plus a 
weighted sum of the differential effects of its behaviour on reproductive success relative to a 
default scenario in which the actor expresses the wild type behaviour. All effects common to 
the mutant and wild type are thus folded into the baseline component of fitness. On this 
marginal interpretation, fitness additivity and actor’s control can be reinterpreted as 
assumptions about marginal effects: what is assumed is that the marginal effects of the 
mutant phenotype, relative to the wild type, are additive and actor controlled.  
 
The upshot is that the assumptions that initially seemed too strong are now reasonable as 
approximations. To see the intuitive rationale for this, consider again the alarm call example. 
The problem here was that making an alarm call reduces the benefit an organism receives 
from an alarm call expressed in others, leading to a violation of actor’s control. But now 
consider the marginal effect of making an alarm call with probability q + δ rather than 
probability q. This will have a first-order effect (proportional to δ) on one’s own reproductive 
success and on the reproductive success of nearby recipients. It will also have a second-order 
effect (proportional to δ2) on the benefit one receives from a very small increase in the 
probability with which another nearby individual makes an alarm call. However, this second-
order effect, which is the source of the trouble for the actor’s control assumption, is precisely 
the kind of effect that the assumption of δ-weak selection entitles us to regard as 
approximately zero, since it relies on the product of two tiny phenotypic differences. 
 
To the critics, the appeal to δ-weak selection here will seem ad hoc: to justify two 
questionable assumptions, we invoke another assumption that seems no less questionable (1, 
7). Why think that selection is usually δ-weak? Why think it is ever δ-weak? However, I do 
not see this as an ad hoc assumption. It is fairer, I think, to see it as an assumption grounded 
in some important background commitments of inclusive fitness theory—commitments that 
can be traced back to Hamilton, but which critics of inclusive fitness do not necessarily share.   
 
At the heart of the Hamiltonian tradition is a version of adaptationism that takes complex 
adaptation, or “organism design”, to be the explanatory target of social evolution research 
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(40, 74). This is combined with an empirical commitment to a gradualist picture of how 
complex adaptation arises. Fisher, a major influence on Hamilton, took complex adaptation to 
result from the gradual accumulation of mutations with tiny phenotypic effects (Darwin was 
also a gradualist, but the picture of adaptation arising through the accumulation of small-
effect mutations is properly credited to Fisher) (75). Fisher posited small-effect mutations on 
the grounds that large-effect mutations are much less likely to cause adaptive improvements. 
In support of this, he offered two iconic arguments: one involving an informal analogy with a 
microscope, the other involving a more formal geometric model.   
 
To paraphrase (and simplify) the informal argument, suppose you are attempting to focus a 
microscope by turning an adjustment knob. Knowing nothing of microscopes, you have no 
idea which way to turn the knob, so you turn it in a random direction. If the adjustment is 
very small, there is a 50% chance it will improve the focus, because any very small 
adjustment in the right direction will help. But the larger the adjustment gets, the lower the 
probability it will be an improvement, because it becomes ever more likely that an 
adjustment, even if it happens to be in the right direction, will overshoot the target.   
 
Using a geometric model in which a population is displaced from the optimum in phenotypic 
space and must find its way back to the optimum through random gene substitutions, Fisher 
showed that the probability of an improvement, which falls off with the size of the 
adjustment even in the one-dimensional case, falls off more rapidly in the case of an 
adjustment in two dimensions, and falls off very rapidly indeed when we are adjusting at 
random in many dimensions, as in the case of a mutation that affects many aspects of the 
phenotype. The chance of improvement is greatest, at 50%, for a mutation that affects the 
phenotype by an infinitesimal amount.   
 
Fisher’s argument has not been without its critics. Kimura argued that, in finite populations, 
mutants with larger effects on the phenotype have a greater chance of going to fixation, 
because mutants with small effects are prone to drifting out of existence (76). Orr showed 
that both Fisher and Kimura could be partially vindicated in relation to different stages of the 
process of cumulative adaptation: the typical effect size of a mutation fixed at an early stage 
in the process, when the phenotype is far from the optimum, is much larger than Fisher 
thought; but, as the phenotype gets closer to optimality, Fisher's concern about overshooting 
becomes increasingly salient and the typical effect size of a fixed mutation becomes 
progressively smaller (77). 
 
Although Fisher's argument remains a source of debate (78, 79), what matters for our 
purposes is that a commitment to Fisherian gradualism is at the heart of Hamilton’s theory of 
social evolution. Consider, for example, the following credo from Hamilton’s collected 
papers:    
 
I was and still am a Darwinian gradualist for most of the issues of evolutionary change. Most 
change comes, I believe, through selected alleles that make small modifications to existing 
structure and behaviour. If one could understand just this case in social situations, who cared 
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much what might happen in the rare cases where the gene changes were great and happened 
not to be disastrous? Whether under social or classical selection, defeat and disappearance 
would, as always, be the usual outcome of genes that cause large changes. I think that a lot of 
the objection to so-called ‘reductionism’ and ‘bean-bag reasoning’ directed at Neodarwinist 
theory comes from people who, whether through inscrutable private agendas or ignorance, are 
not gradualists, being instead inhabitants of some imagined world of super-fast progress. Big 
changes, strong interlocus interactions, hopeful monsters, mutations so abundant and so 
hopeful that several may be under selection at one time—these have to be the stuff of their 
dreams if their criticisms are to make sense (80, pp. 27-28). 
 
Thus a focus on δ-weak selection is grounded in the core commitments of Hamilton’s 
program. The subset of selection processes for which inclusive fitness is a valid fitness 
concept is the same subset Hamilton and his successors take, on independent grounds, to be 
responsible for the cumulative assembly of complex adaptations. 
 
3.2.2 Inclusive fitness as a criterion for improvement 
There is more to be said, however, about the connection between inclusive fitness and 
cumulative adaptive evolution. The fact that inclusive fitness is a valid fitness concept under 
δ-weak selection does not give it any advantage over other valid fitness concepts. But, in the 
context of explaining cumulative adaptation, there is a different theoretical role for a fitness 
concept with respect to which inclusive fitness is distinctively valuable: that of providing a 
criterion for phenotypic improvement. 
 
Suppose we are trying to explain the evolution of a complex adaptation through the gradual 
accumulation of tiny improvements to the phenotype. Talk of improvement implies a 
standard with respect to which improvement can be judged. In this context, we want more 
from a fitness concept than accurate calculations of short-term gene frequency change and 
short-term equilibria. We also want a fitness concept that can provide a stable criterion, 
throughout the whole process, for what constitutes an improvement to the phenotype. In other 
words, we want a property of an organism, X, such that new mutants are systematically 
favoured over the wild type if and only if they make a positive causal contribution (in 
contrast with the wild type) to X. The distinctive advantage of inclusive fitness over other 
fitness concepts is that it is a good candidate for property X.   
 
To see why, imagine a process of social evolution in which natural selection gradually shapes 
various different aspects of a complex social strategy involving the conditional expression of 
different actions in different contexts. In one context, C1, the strategy produces actions that 
benefit the actor; in another context, C2, the strategy produces actions that confer benefits on 
genetically related recipients. Mutants periodically arise (one at a time) that alter some aspect 
of the strategy very slightly, implying δ-weak selection.  
 
Suppose natural selection targets different aspects of the phenotype at different times: the 
strategy is initially shaped by selection for enhanced benefits for the actor in C1, then goes 
through a stage in which it is shaped by selection for greater benefits conferred on genetically 
related recipients in C2, and then finally goes through a streamlining stage in which the cost 
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to the actor of conferring benefits on relatives in C2 is gradually reduced. A more realistic 
scenario would involve the shaping of all these aspects of the phenotype as and when relevant 
mutants arise; but, for the purpose of fixing ideas, it helps to think of selection targeting 
different aspects in discrete stages. 
 
At all stages in this hypothetical process, the actor’s inclusive fitness provides a criterion for 
improvement: all and only those mutants that causally promote (in contrast to the wild type) 
the inclusive fitness of the actor are favoured. The same cannot be said of the actor’s 
reproductive success, since mutants that detract from this quantity are favoured during the 
middle stage; nor can it be said of the recipient’s reproductive success, since mutants that 
may be neutral or deleterious with respect to this quantity are favoured in the initial and final 
stages.   
 
The cumulative assembly of social adaptations through δ-weak selection thus constitutes a 
special context in which inclusive fitness is both valid and valuable. It is valid because its 
assumptions are reasonable as approximations when selection is δ-weak. It is valuable 
because, unlike other fitness concepts, it provides a stable criterion for what constitutes an 
improvement as natural selection shapes different aspects of the phenotype. 
 
3.3 The way forward 
The assumptions of inclusive fitness are empirically questionable if interpreted as exact 
claims about total effects. However, they can be justified as approximations regarding 
marginal effects under δ-weak selection, which is to say selection on tiny differences between 
the mutant and the wild type. The assumption of δ-weak selection is grounded in a 
methodological stance that takes complex adaptation to be the explanatory target of social 
evolution research, together with an empirical commitment to a gradualist picture on which 
complex adaptation arises through the accumulation of small improvements. In the context of 
a process of cumulative adaptive evolution by δ-weak selection for small improvements, 
inclusive fitness has a distinctive role to play as the criterion for improvement. 
 
 
4. Selection, design and optimality 
 
This special issue provides an opportunity to reflect not only on the mathematical foundations 
of inclusive fitness theory, but also on its connections to questions of purpose, design and 
optimality in the natural world. Here too, we find that the two opposing camps in the current 
controversy hold radically different views.  
 
4.1 One extreme 
Defenders of inclusive fitness are, for the most part, adaptationists who regard natural 
selection as a powerful generator of phenotypic optimality. Here we should distinguish two 
types of adaptationism. We noted above that inclusive fitness theorists take complex 
adaptation (or “organism design”) to be their main explanatory target. Because this is a 
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methodological choice, rather than a claim about nature, it is a version of methodological 
adaptationism (81, 82). This should be distinguished from the claim that natural selection has 
a robust tendency to generate phenotypic optimality, and that we should therefore expect 
organisms to behave as if at least approximately optimizing their inclusive fitness. This is a 
claim about nature, and it is therefore a version of empirical adaptationism (81, 82). 
 
I am sceptical of the second, stronger form of adaptationism (83, 84). The issue is a complex 
one, but for current purposes it is sufficient to note that the ability of natural selection to 
produce cumulative improvement depends on many variables, including the stability of the 
environment, the strength of other evolutionary causes such as drift, and the genetic 
architecture underlying the trait (85-87). Although social evolution researchers like to play 
the “phenotypic gambit” and assume that the genetic basis of social traits is simple and 
conducive to adaptation (88), we must remember that this is a gambit—an opening bet—and 
not a well supported empirical assumption. Genetic detail often turns out to matter, and there 
are many reasons why a process of cumulative improvement may stall, or never get off the 
ground at all (83, 84). There is no reason to assume that these variables are generally 
favourable to cumulative improvement in natural populations, and there is no substitute for 
testing the underlying assumptions of optimality models empirically (89, 90). 
 
Note, however, that merely regarding inclusive fitness as a criterion for improvement does 
not imply any commitment to empirical adaptationism. We are saying here that inclusive 
fitness provides the bar against which the improvement or degradation of a trait should be 
judged. This does not imply that natural selection will always, often, or indeed ever succeed 
in generating cumulative improvement, let alone optimality, in the natural world. The 
question of how often this happens is not a question theory alone can settle (83, 84).  
 
Inclusive fitness optimization should not, therefore, be taken as an unchallenged foundation 
for projects in behavioural ecology. It should be regarded as an empirical conjecture that may 
hold in some populations some of the time, but not in all populations all of the time. I do not 
think this concession undermines inclusive fitness theory in any significant way. It should, 
however, spur us to investigate the special features of those “paradigm Darwinian 
populations” (in Godfrey-Smith’s terminology) in which cumulative improvement does 
reliably occur (87).  
 
4.2 Another extreme  
Allen et al write that	  “There is no universal design principle … [and] no universal 
maximands or design principles are needed to understand the evolution of social behavior” 
(7). If the intended emphasis is on the term universal, and if Allen et al are happy to grant a 
role for design principles with circumscribed domains of application, I find little to disagree 
with here. But I suspect they are expressing a broader scepticism about the use of “design 
thinking” in social evolution research—that is, scepticism about the general strategy of 
attempting to understand behaviour by looking for a “design objective” the behaviour 
promotes. 
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In contrast, I maintain there is a legitimate, though circumscribed, role for design thinking in 
the study of social evolution. The gradualist’s dictum, common to Darwin, Fisher and 
Hamilton, is that, when we find a complex adaptation, we should infer that it has been 
produced by a process of cumulative adaptive evolution in which small incremental 
improvements were favoured, and not by the sudden appearance of a hopeful monster 
followed by a single-step selection process. But note that the concept of improvement is 
indispensable to an understanding of this process: the fact that natural selection 
systematically favours improvements to the phenotype is what makes the process cumulative 
and the end products adaptive. Note, moreover, that the notion of improvement is 
unintelligible without a standard with respect to which improvement is to be judged, and that 
inclusive fitness provides the appropriate standard (Section 3). To be a gradualist is therefore 
to acknowledge a place in evolutionary biology for a limited form of design thinking, based 
around the concept of improvement, and a legitimate place for inclusive fitness as the fitness 
concept with respect to which an improvement is defined. 
 
4.3 The way forward 
There is a special type of evolutionary process—the gradual assembly of complex adaptation 
through the accumulation of small improvements—with respect to which a form of design 
thinking is appropriate. In this special context, as noted in Section 3, inclusive fitness has a 
special role as the criterion for improvement. This is not to endorse a universal design 
principle. Theory alone cannot tell us how often, if ever, natural selection leads to cumulative 
improvement, let alone optimality, and such a process is not to be expected in all populations 
at all times. However, the existence of complex adaptations is not in doubt, and this indicates 
that natural selection has succeeded in generating cumulative improvement in at least some 
cases. These cases hold a special (and understandable) fascination for behavioural ecologists 
in the Hamiltonian tradition, which helps explain and justify their continuing attachment to 
the concept of inclusive fitness. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In attempting to reconcile the two camps in the inclusive fitness controversy, I hope to have 
arrived at a synthesis that does justice to the insights of both sides, and not merely at an 
awkward compromise. Hamilton’s rule in its regression-based form—a statistical, 
population-level result—has genuine predictive and explanatory limitations, but it remains 
valuable as an organizing framework for social evolution research. There is room for a 
productive debate regarding its relative value in comparison to other possible organizing 
frameworks, such as multi-level selection theory; and progress on this issue can be made by 
identifying the properties we value in an organizing framework, and by evaluating the extent 
to which different frameworks possess these properties.  
 
Meanwhile, inclusive fitness—which, for Hamilton, was a causal property of an individual 
organism—relies on the assumptions of fitness additivity and actor’s control. These 
assumptions are reasonable approximations given a specific type of weak selection. There is 
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room for productive debate about whether (as the critics suggest) weak selection represents a 
far-fetched case of little biological interest, or whether (as Hamilton and his defenders would 
have it) it is the process through which complex adaptation is cumulatively assembled. If the 
latter is correct, inclusive fitness has a special role to play as a criterion for improvement, and 
this licenses a limited form of design thinking.  
 
This short paper has not aimed to settle these debates. But I hope to have shown that the 
differences between the two sides are not irresolvable, and that productive debate on these 
issues is possible. 
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